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grossly negligent. The court held that
once it was established that Liscombe was
contributorily negligent as a matter oflaw
it was up to Liscombe to prove gross negligence on the part of the defendants. Evidence at trial showed that the defendants
were aware of the dangerous position of
the overhead lines, because one month before a similar, less serious, accident occurred. However, the court found that
Potomac and Hagerstown acted reasonably
in trying to prevent further accidents. The
evidence showed red flags had been hung
from the wires, oral warnings were given
to all trucks entering the plant, and Potomac had staked out a new route for the
wires. After an examination of the facts,
the court found the defendants acted reasonably under the situation and were not
guilty of gross negligence.
The court dismissed Liscombe's last argument, that the issue oflast clear chance
should have been left for the jury, by holding the doctrine inapplicable in this case.
The court, citing Sanner v. Suard, 236
Md. 271, 203 A.2d 885 (1964), held that
in Maryland the last clear chance doctrine
has no application when the negligence of
the plaintiff is concurrent with the negligence of the defendant, and the defendant
had no opportunity to avoid the accident
after the original negligence. In the case at
bar no such opportunity was afforded to
the defendants.
The court of appeals' decision in Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co. reaffirms the
Maryland judiciary's position that a plaintiff guilty of negligence, however slight, is
completely barred from recovery. The
burden placed upon the defendant in electrical shock cases is slight. In the absence
of wanton or reckless conduct on the part
of the defendant, a person who knew or
should have known that a wire is dangerous, and puts himself close enough to it to
receive a shock, is contributorily negligent
as a matter of law and is thus barred from
recovery.

-Stephen Markey

American Federation of State,
County, and Munidpal Employees v.
State of Washington: NINTH
CIRCUIT REJECTS COMPARABLE
WORTH
In American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the state's decision
to base compensation on the competitive
market rather than on a theory of comparable worth did not establish its liability
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under a disparate impact analysis. The
court held that the state's participation in
the market system did not allow the inference of discriminatory motive so as to establish its liability under a disparate treatment theory, since the state did not create
the market disparity and was not shown to
have been motivated by impermissible sexbased considerations in setting salaries.
The State of Washington was sued in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington by two unions:
the American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, (AFSCME), and
the Washington Federation of State Employees, (WFSE), on behalf of a class of
15,500 state employees who work or have

wage disparity of about twenty percent to
the disadvantage of employees in jobs held
predominately by women for jobs of comparable worth held predominately by men.
Comparable worth was determined by a
four-prong test: knowledge and skills, mental demands, accountability, and working
conditions. Similar surveys were conducted in 1976 and 1980. In 1983, the
state adopted a ten-year plan to correct the
disparity.
The district court ordered immediate
implementation of a system of compensation based on comparable worth as well as
back pay. The district court based its determination of sex discrimination on two
theories: disparate impact and dispa~ate

worked in jobs consisting of at least seventy
percent female employees. The district
court found that the state discriminated on
the basis of sex by compensating employees
in predominately female jobs at lower rates
than employees in predominately male
jobs, where the jobs were found to be although dissimilar, of comparable worth to
the employer. The district court found
Washington State in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c.
§ 200e-2(a) (1982).
The State of Washington sets its employee salaries at rates comparable to the
prevailing market rates in the public and
private sectors. Market rates are determined by a process of surveys, hearings,
and state budget analyses. In 1974, the
state conducted a wage disparity study entitled "The Willis Study" which found a

treatment. Disparate impact discrimination involves a facially neutral employment practice that, without business justification, has a disproportionately adverse
impact upon members of a group protected
under Title VII. Proof of intent is not required, because, where a practice is specific and focused, the question is whether
the employer's explanation for the compensation policy reveals that it is a pretext
for discrimination. For disparate treatment analysis, discriminatory intent is an
essential element. Under the disparate
treatment theory, to establish intent, it is
insufficient for the plaintiff to show that
the employer was merely aware of the adverse consequences of a compensation policy. The plaintiff must show that the employer chose the policy, at least partly,
because of its adverse effects.

The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's finding of liability under
both the disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories. The court stated that
Washington's decision to base compensation on the competitive market, rather
than on a theory of comparable worth, was
not a clearly delineated practice applied at
a single point in the job selection process.
The court noted that the decision to base
compensation on the competitive market
involves the assessment offactors too complex and multifaceted for disparate impact
analysis. Some of those factors included:
surveys, hearings, administrative recommendations, budget proposals, executive
actions and legislative enactments. As a result there was no disparate impact found.
The U.S. Court of Appeals overturned
the district court's determination of disparate treatment because it found that discriminatory intent had not been proven.
Although in appropriate cases discriminatory intent may be inferred from circumstantial or direct evidence, the court held
that the findings of "The Willis Study"
alone, (that the state sets compensation at
the market rate), would not establish the
requisite intent without corroborating evidence. The court stated that although the
state participates in the market system, it
did not create the market disparity and
that setting pay rates according to the prevailing market rate does not support the
inference of intent to discriminate. The
court noted that in some cases an inference
of intent may be drawn from statistical evidence, but the weight given to statistical
evidence is determined by the existence of
independent corroborative evidence of discrimination such as testimony of specific
incidents of discrimination.
The court also rejected AFSCME's contention that because the state commissioned "The Willis Study", it was committed to implementing a new system of
compensation based on comparable worth
as defined in the study. The court was hesitant to adopt a rule that had the effect of
penalizing rather than commending employers for their innovation in undertaking
such a study. The court was also reluctant
to bind the state to base its decision on
the results of one study because different
studies produce different results which the
employer should be permitted to take into
account when determining rate of pay. The
U.S. Court of Appeals found neither disparate impact nor disparate treatment.
They held, therefore, that no Title VII
violation had occurred.
(AFSCME is currently petitioning the
United States Supreme Court to hear this
case.)
-Audrey A. Creighton

Hamilton v. State: JUDICIAL
APPROVAL OF "JAIL HOUSE
PLANTS"
In Hamilton v. State, 62 Md. App. 603,
490 A.2d 763 (1985), the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland held that a defendant's statements to an acquaintance while
both were incarcerated, did not amount to
custodial interrogation requiring Miranda
warnings even though the acquaintance
carried on the conversation at the direction
of the police.
In the course of a murder investigation,
the Maryland State Police became suspicious of the defendant, Raymond Hamilton, who was incarcerated in the Maryland House of Correction in connection
with an unrelated matter. At the behest of
the State Police, an acquaintance of Hamilton's, named Fowler, agreed to tape his
conversation with the defendant in exchange for the authorities' consideration
on pending charges. On two occasions, the
acquaintance visited Hamilton and elicited
from him incriminating statements regarding the murder. These statements were
made without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the defendant's
motion to suppress his statements, and as a
result he was subsequently convicted of
murder and various related offenses.

On appeal, the defendant argued that
the admission of the statements made to
the acquaintance were in violation of his
fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. The court noted, as a preliminary matter, that the admission of the
taped conversations violated neither the
Maryland nor federal wiretap statute. MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROe. CODE ANN. §
1O-402(c)(2)(1984); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a)(c)
(1982). Additionally, the court held that
the admission of the tapes did not violate
Hamilton's fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures
because "[t]he law gives no protection to
the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice
is or becomes a police agent ...." Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 608, 590 A.2d at 766
(quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745,752 (1971».
Turning to the defendant's fifth amendment claim, Judge Alpert, writing for a
unanimous court, stated that "Miranda
warnings must be given when 'an individ-
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